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to allow the use of some device to protect 
the witness from viewing the defendant. In 
such a case, the interest would outweigh 
the defendant's right to face-to-face con-
frontation. 
The interest to protect child witnesses 
from literal face-to-face confrontation 
would be a proper compelling interest to 
allow something other than direct face-to-
face confrontation. Id. Justice O'Connor 
continued noting that the confrontation 
clause "reflects a preference for face-to-face 
confrontation at trial .... " Id. Further-
more, the Coy decision should not be read 
to discourage state legislatures from pro-
tecting child witnesses. Even if certain leg-
islation is judged to run contrary to the 
confrontation clause, it might fall within 
an exception and thus the protection 
device may be used. 
In a bitter dissent, Justice Blackrnun, 
joined by the Chief Justice, felt that nei-
ther Coy's right to confrontation nor his 
due process right was violated.The dissent 
believed that the right to confrontation 
gives the defendant a "right to be shown 
that the accuser is real and the right to 
probe [the] accuser and [his] accusation in 
front of the trier of fact." Id. (Blackrnun, 
J., dissenting). Justice Blackrnun believed 
that these criteria were met in Coy's case. 
He noted that Coy could see the girls 
through the screen, the girls could see the 
judge, jury and counsel, and they could see 
the girls, the jury could see Coy while the 
girls testified, and the girls were told that 
Coy could see and hear them while they 
testified. Id. at 2806. The dissent argued 
that Coy's objection that the girls could 
not see him while they testified was too 
narrow. Justice Blackrnun felt that the 
plurality's holding that the witness must 
have the ability to see the defendant will 
put a roadblock in front of state legisla-
tures trying to protect child witnesses. 
Justice Blackrnun also felt that the con-
frontation clause has as its essential pur-
pose the right of cross-examination. Id. at 
2808. This was based on Dean Wigmore's 
statement that "[t]here never was at com-
mon law any recognized right to an 
indispensable thing called confrontation as 
distinguished from cross·examination." 5 J. 
Wigmore, Evidence § 1397, 158 O. Chad-
bourn rev. 1974}. This principle is sup-
ported by the fact that many hearsay 
statements may be admitted at trial even 
though the defendant does not get to con-
front the person who made the hearsay 
statement. Coy, __ U.S. at -> 108 S. 
Ct. at 2809. As a further explanation of 
this point, Justice Blackrnun gave an exam-
ple of a blind person who could not see the 
defendant. With a blind person, however, 
the defendant could not make the same 
objection that Coy did. Therefore, Justice 
Blackrnun felt that the right to cross-
examine a witness was the essential part of 
the confrontation clause. 
Justice Blackrnun believed that the pro-
tection of children was an extremely 
important public interest to protect. Rec-
ognizing this, he felt that the use of the 
screen outweighed Coy's right to face-to-
face confrontation with the girls. 
Finally, Justice Blackrnun concluded 
that the screen did not unduly prejudice 
Coy such that his due process was vio-
lated. He noted that a screen does not im-
ply guilt as do other things like shackles. 
Id. at 2810. Furthermore, the jury was 
given an instruction which told them 
explicitly not to draw any inferences of 
guilt from the screen. Justice Blackrnun 
felt this was sufficient to overcome Coy's 
due process argument. Id. 
The plurality in Coy concluded that a 
defendant in a criminal trial has the right 
to literal face-to-face confrontation of the 
witnesses against him except in certain sit-
uations. These situations arise when there 
is a strong public policy interest which 
outweighs the right to confrontation. The 
Coy Court concluded that when a legisla-
ture enacts a statute based on general find-
ings, it will not be enough to show a public 
interest that outweighs the right to con-
frontation. It should be noted, however, 
that Justice Kennedy did not participate in 
this decision in any way. 
- Richard ],f. Goldberg 
Austin v. Thrifty Diversified: 
EMPLOYER'S liABILITY 
EXPANDED WHILE EMPLOYEE 
ON EMPLOYER'S PREMISES 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland in Austin v. Thrifty Diversified, 
76 Md. App. 150, 543 A.2d 889 (1988), 
rejected a wrongful death claim, but found 
that an employee who was injured after 
normal working hours while using his 
employer's equipment, on the employer's 
premises, and with the employer's permis-
sion, was covered instead under the exclu-
sive remedy of the Worker's 
Compensation Act. The court agreed with 
the trial court that the employee's death 
arose out of and in the course of his 
employment. 
Thrifty Diversified hired John Douglas 
Austin to work as a certified welder. On 
the day of the accident he received per-
mission to use the company's arc welding 
machine to repair the exhaust system on a 
friend's automobile. Austin was to per-
form the repairs on the employer's 
premises after his regular shift ended. 
While using the arc welding machine to 
make the repairs, Austin was electrocuted. 
Austin's parents instituted a wrongful 
death action. The employer moved for 
summary judgment on the grounds that 
the exclusive remedy was under the 
Worker's Compensation Act ("the Act"). 
The Act lists the duties that employers 
owe to their employees. It provides, in 
pertinent part, that: 
[e]very employer subject to the provi-
sions of this article, shall payor pro-
vide as required herein compensation 
according to the schedules of this arti-
cle for the disability or death of his 
employee resulting from an accidental 
personal injury sustained by the 
employee arising out of and in the 
course of his employment without 
regard to fault as a cause of such 
injury .... 
Md. Ann. Code art. 101, §15 (1957). 
Therefore, the question addressed was 
whether this accident arose out of and in 
the course of the decendent's employment. 
In answering this question, the court 
first looked at the causal connection 
between the injury and the employment. 
The court reasoned that but for his 
employment, Austin's death would not 
have ensued. Because he was an employee 
of Thrifty, Austin was allowed to use the 
company's arc welder for a personal pro-
ject on their premises. "Moreover, the 
instrumentality of the death, the place 
where it happened, and the activity giving 
rise to it were the same as those he [Austin] 
encountered in his employment;" 76 Md. 
App. at 159, 543 A.2d at 894. The court 
concluded that the accident arose out of 
the deceased's employment. 
The difficulty facing the court, however, 
was the question of "in the course of 
employment." Section 15 of the Worker's 
Compensation Act requires both "arising 
out of' and "in the course of employ-
ment." It is not an either/or test. Both fac-
tors must be present in order to apply the 
exclusive remedy of the Act. 
To determine if the activity meets the 
"in the course of employment" test, it 
must be shown that the activity is suffi-
ciently work-related to be an incident of 
employment. An activity is an incident of 
employment if "the employer expects or 
receives substantial benefit" from his 
employees participating in that activity. 
Md. App. at 160, 543 A.2d at 894. 
The court found that compensation ben-
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efits had been awarded in cases where the 
injury resulted from participating in recre-
ational or social events. The court reason-
ed that allowing an employee to use his 
employer's equipment for personal pro-
jects on its premises also benefitted the 
employer in a similar fashion as participat-
ing in recreational or social events. The 
benefit to the employer in allowing and 
encouraging these activities is the creation 
and maintenance of good employer-
employee relationships. Good employee 
morale benefits the employer. "The bene-
fit expected by, or accruing to, the 
employer as a result of allowing personal 
projects to be done using its equipment 
and on its premises is no different than 
that flowing to the employer as a result of 
its sponsorship of recreational or social 
events." Md. App. at 162,543 A.2d at 895. 
Therefore, Austin's activity met the "in 
the course of employment" requirement 
of section 15 of the Act. 
In holding that such an activity arises 
out of and in the course of employment, 
the court of special appeals has expanded 
the employer's liability for the insurance 
of its employees. Accordingly, employers 
and their insurance companies will now 
find themselves with even greater responsi-
bility for the activities of employees while 
on the employer's premises. 
-Rita Kaufman 
State '0. Garlick: 
CONFRONTATION RIGHT NOT 
OFFENDED BY ADMIITING 
LABORATORY TEST RESULTS 
INTO EVIDENCE WITHOUT 
TECHNICIAN'S TESTIMONY 
In State '0. Garlick, 313 Md. 209, 545 
A.2d 27 (1988), the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland held that the respondent's right 
of confrontation was not offended by the 
admission into evidence of laboratory test 
results contained in his hospital record 
without the testimony of the hospital tech-
nician and without accounting for the 
technician's unavailability. In so holding, 
the court reversed the 'holding of the court 
of special appeals. 
On June 16, 1985, the respondent Gary 
Ray Garlick (Garlick) was driving east-
bound on U.S. Route 50. As he approach-
ed the Chesapeake Bay Bridge toll plaza at 
an excessive rate of speed, he swerved into 
another lane, smashing into the rear of a 
car waiting for change. The impact forced 
both cars past the toll booth. A police offi-
cer soon arrived and observed that Garlick 
was "extremely incoherent" and had 
"great difficulty" finding papers necessary 
for identification. The officer arrested Gar-
lick, charging him with failure to reduce 
speed to avoid an accident, failure to stop 
and render aid, and driving under the 
influence of a controlled dangerous 
substance. 
The officer took Garlick to Anne 
Arundel General Hospital where the 
emergency room physician, Dr. Joel R. 
Buchanan, Jr., examined Garlick. After 
Garlick gave abnormal responses to a 
neurological exam, the doctor ordered 
blood and urine tests. The blood test 
indicated that there was phencyclidine 
(PCP) present in Garlick's system. 
The technician who administered the 
test did not appear at the trial in the Cir-
cuit Court for Anne Arundel County, and 
his report was not admitted into evidence. 
Dr. Buchanan, however, appeared as a 
witness, and the emergency room report, 
which referred to the test results, was 
admitted into evidence. Garlick's objec-
tion regarding the admissibility of this 
report was overruled. Although acquitted 
on the charge of failing to stop and render 
aid, Garlick was found guilty of driving 
while under the influence of a controlled 
dangerous substance and of failing to 
reduce speed to avoid an accident. The 
court of special appeals later determined 
that the blood test results, contained in the 
emergency room report, should not have 
been admitted into evidence and reversed 
the conviction. Garlick '0. State, No. 12 





The court of appeals granted certiorari to 
consider the admissibility of the test 
results. 
The sixth amendment of the United 
States Constitution, made applicable to the 
states through the fourteenth amendment, 
and article 21 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights, provide that every defendant in 
a criminal prosecution has a right to con-
front the witness against him. This right 
"(1) insures that the witness will give his 
statements under oath ... ; (2) forces the 
witness to submit to cross-
examination, ... ;[and] (3) permits the jury 
that is to decide the defendant's fate to 
observe the demeanor of the witness mak-
ing his statement .... " Lee '0. Illinois, 476 
U.S. 530 (1986) (quoting California '0. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970». 
Garlick argued that his right of confron-
tation was violated because the results of 
his blood test were admitted, although the 
hospital technician was not called to 
appear as a witness. To support this con-
tention, he relied upon /lloon '0. State, 300 
Md. 354, 478 A.2d 695 (1984), eert. denied, 
469 U.S. 1207 (1985). In that case, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland did not 
allow a hospital record to be admitted 
unaccompanied by the technician's testi-
mony. The Garlick court, however, was 
unpersuaded by /IIoon, recognizing that 
the circumstances in the earlier case distin-
guished it from the case at bar. 
In Moon, a blood sample was not 
analyzed until three days after it had been 
taken. In addition, the defendant's name 
did not appear on the report, and the tests 
were not performed until after the patient 
received the treatment for which the tests 
were sought. Considering these facts, the 
/If oon court felt that the need for the tech-
nician to testify was .. neither frivolous nor 
pointless." Id. at 370-71, 478 A.2d at 703. 
Moreover, one's confrontation right usual-
ly requires that if the hearsay declarant is 
unavailable for cross-examination at trial, 
proof of his unavailability must be offered. 
Id. at 367-68, 478 A.2d at 701-02. Nonethe-
less, the Moon court recognized instances 
involving "no confrontation violation 
because the evidence . . . offered is clothed 
with substantial indicia of reliability. Such 
evidence is admitted without the 
declarant's testimony when producing the 
witness would likely prove unavailing or 
pointless. Business and hospital records fall 
within this category .... " Id. at 369, 478 
A.2d at 702-03. 
The case sub judice turns on the business 
records exception to the rule against hear-
say. The court relied on a 1925 case that 
examined this issue. Globe Indemnity Co. 
'tI. Reinhart held that the hearsay exception 
was based on the "circumstantial guaran-
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